North Korea

‘Don’t expect any form of denuclearization quickly’: UUֱ�� expert on Trump's North Korean deal

ullahnor — Wed, 13 Jun 2018 15:30:48 +0000

‘Don’t expect any form of denuclearization quickly’: UUֱ�� expert on Trump's North Korean deal

ullahnor Wed, 06/13/2018 - 11:30

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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump meet during a historic summit in Singapore on Tuesday (photo by Kevin Lim/The Strait Times/Handout/Getty Images)

Noreen Ahmed-Ullah

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Global Lens

Donald Trump

Faculty of Arts & Science

Global

Humanities

Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy

North Korea

U.S. President Donald Trump was quick to declare his landmark summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un a success. This morning, he continued on that path, tweeting, “There is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea…sleep well tonight!”

The two leaders met in Singapore on Tuesday, signing a declaration on denuclearization and reducing tensions. Trump has said Pyongyang has agreed to complete denuclearization, and that the U.S. would end joint military exercises with South Korea.

Andre Schmid, associate professor of East Asian studies in the Faculty of Arts & Science and the Munk School of Global Affairs, offers up a reality check on the pact and the history of U.S.-North Korea relations.

What’s your take on the summit and North Korea agreeing to denuclearization? Why did North Korea accede so quickly?

North Korea has a long history of calling for denuclearization as part of its diplomatic strategies. For most of its history – or, at least, ever since 1958 when the United States first introduced nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula – these calls for denuclearization focused on the weapons of others. As North Korea developed its own weapons, its calls for denuclearization have been framed largely in a specific phrase: “denuclearization of the peninsula.” This creates an opening to contemplate the possibility of its own denuclearization but the point of this phrase, often missed by the North American media, is that North Korea never sees this in isolation and never defines it as unilateral denuclearization. Don’t expect any form of denuclearization quickly.

It’s been remarkable to watch as Trump has been completely able to frame the issue of denuclearization in the English-language media. When he first started, his policy was for a quick “win.” Remember when it was all supposed to happen – “no problem” – in six months? He changed his tune as the summit approached – evidence that he, too, can learn once in a while. But, quite incredibly, the media now uses the initial terms he set – the quick resolution – as the criteria for judging the success or lack thereof of the summit. Did any one seriously expect Trump to return after a short sit-down with Chairman Kim with a resolution to a decades-old challenge?

Should we trust North Korea to uphold its side of the bargain on denuclearization and destroying a major missile testing site? Why the change of heart in North Korea?

It’s quite clear that North Korea is willing to destroy certain facilities as well as curtail some of its experiments and testing as part of an agreement or to create a diplomatic opening for an agreement. This shouldn’t be read as a willingness either to denuclearize completely or to permit the type of verification protocols that, for example, were implemented however briefly in the Tehran deal. My guess is that we are going to have to learn to live with the fait accompli of North Korea as a nuclear state. The realistic question is how can they be limited and controlled.

Why the change of heart in North Korea? That’s the big question. In part, it is in reaction to the change of heart in the countries surrounding them – in South Korea, a president elected on a platform of engagement who is willing to be a flexible mediator; in the U.S., the swaggering bellicosity of the Trump administration, as well as the tensions with China. It’s still unclear how much, if any, impact the UN economic sanctions have had on North Korea's economy since, according to the latest assessments coming out of Seoul, the North Korean economy continues to grow. That growth relates to the greater emphasis Kim Jong-un is putting on the economy – though it’s still too early to know his intentions in this realm. Loosening the sanctions to create more possibilities for the economy is also a motivation – though, again like with so many North Korean matters, we do not know how much of a priority this is.

Another way of looking at this is that North Korea has been successfully pursuing a long-term strategy of developing nukes precisely because it was a rational and cheaper way to defend itself while offering various other negotiating possibilities on the international stage. We wouldn’t be having this summit, and North Korea would likely simply be ignored if it were not for the nukes. If you believe this, the North Korean regime’s strategy – minus the cost on segments of the population, of course – has been been what Trump likes to call a “win.”

What has the U.S. agreed to? What security guarantees is Trump talking about?

That’s another big question: What is the U.S. willing to give in negotiations. I have to admit I’m surprised that Trump gave up on the joint military exercises – something that North Korea and China have called for, for many years. You can be sure that will be insufficient for the North Koreans.

A peace treaty to end the Korean War (1950-53), which was terminated with only an armistice, would be at least a starting point.

This has been such a strange relationship, starting with threats, then an agreement to talk, then the talks being called off and then being called back on again. Can you speak to how this has all unfolded and whether this is reflective of Trump or Kim Jong-un?

North and South Korean states have a long history of tumultuous relations with many stops and starts, many hopes and many dashed hopes. Throw in Trump’s personality to that mix, and it is not surprising that an already dramatic international issue has ratcheted up the spectacle. In terms of the fundamentals, however, the same questions and struggles remain beneath that spectacle. There is still no clear path to a negotiated peace in Northeast Asia.

What does this mean for Canada?

There’s a fundamental question: What can Canada do? Since establishing diplomatic ties with North Korea in the early 2000s, we have done very little – this despite the proud tradition of our diplomatic service having worked to establish productive relations with the People’s Republic of China well before the United States. The recent Vancouver summit on North Korea, sponsored by Global Affairs Canada, offered some possibilities, which I hope will be taken up now that the United States is talking with North Korea. Of course, any initiative with North Korea will inevitably be overshadowed by our relation with Washington, D.C., especially after the debacle of the G7 summit. But if there is any issue where more actors need to be engaged, it is on the Korean peninsula. The Canadian government should be working closely with the South Korean government – the real movers on the Korean peninsula – to determine what positive role they can play.

North Korean missile test a 'game-changer,' UUֱ�� expert says

geoff.vendeville — Wed, 05 Jul 2017 15:14:29 +0000

North Korean missile test a 'game-changer,' UUֱ�� expert says

geoff.vendeville Wed, 07/05/2017 - 11:14

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On Tuesday, North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (photo by South Korean Defense Ministry via Getty Images)

Geoffrey Vendeville

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Geoffrey Vendeville

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Only China has the influence to de-escalate tensions with North Korea, says PhD candidate Tina Park

North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile on Tuesday which experts say can strike as far as Alaska or even Hawaii, ratcheting up tensions in the region and beyond.

Will the latest missile test mean rethinking how to deal with the North Korean threat?

Tina Park, co-founder and executive director of the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect in UUֱ��'s Munk School of Global Affairs and a history PhD candidate who focuses on Korean-Canadian relations, addressed this with UUֱ�� News' Geoffrey Vendeville.

Park speaks to Radio Canada International about the missile test

What kind of message has the North sent with this latest missile test?

The fact that it (the ICBM) can reach the United States now poses real challenges for engagement.

What it really means in terms of North Korea's relationship with South Korea or even with the United States is that it shows there's no room for engagement policy or de-nuclearization, although South Korean President Moon Jae-in appears still committed to finding a peaceful solution.

With the change in government in South Korea – because he was more left-leaning than his predecessors – it was expected that South Korea's policy on North Korea would also change a little bit. But in return for President Moon's offer for engagement and dialogue, North Korea actually went forward with the [intercontinental ballistic missile] ICBM.

That's a violation of UN resolutions and a hiking of tensions in the Korean Peninsula. It's also a game-changer because now North Koreans could mount a nuclear weapon on an ICBM – if the test was in fact successful.

We don't know for sure how successful its long-range technology is, especially its re-entry capabilities – what it allows an ICBM warhead to survive the intense heat and destruction of its outer shell as it plunges through the Earth's atmosphere.

You're in Seoul now. What is the atmosphere there?

North Korea’s ICBM testing is certainly making headlines here in Seoul. But it is important to note that there is a bit of difference in terms of how average Koreans are carrying on with their lives, and how the crisis is seen from outside. South Koreans are well aware that conventional weapons along the 38th parallel are sufficient to cause a lot of damage very quickly and are not easily stirred by provocations coming from the North. The main concern here at home is about the new Moon government’s domestic priorities, such as tackling unemployment among the youth and revitalizing South Korea’s economy.

U.S. President Donald Trump has put a lot faith in working with China to impose economic sanctions on North Korea. What do you think of this strategy?

The point about China is very important. North Korea's top trade partner is China – 90 per cent of its imports and exports go through China. If you look at the flow of money, China is the only country with any meaningful leverage on North Korea. That said, China has put business before politics.

So far various efforts to impose economic sanctions on North Korea on behalf of the international community have largely failed because China continues to trade with North Korea.

So is there any point continuing to try to persuade China to pressure North Korea?

What we need is for China to actually use its leverage. It hasn't.

China has the ability to restrain North Korea if it really wished to use its muscle. So far there is no clear incentive for China to do that. The West has to offer some kind of an attractive offer for China to do this beyond de-nuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. China certainly doesn't want an influx of refugees from North Korea after a regime collapse, and China doesn't want any greater American influence on the Korean Peninsula.

There has been speculation in the media about the risks of a pre-emptive strike. Is military action a solution?

It is true that the United States theoretically has the capacity to surgically take out the missiles and major artillery sites in the North, but it's very unlikely. Even though the United States has 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea... a pre-emptive military strike was always considered too risky. This has to do with the geo-strategic location of the Korean Peninsula. It's right in the centre of North East Asia with very powerful neighbours like China, Japan, Russia, Mongolia etc. Any military engagement with North Korea – however surgical – will have ramifications in the South. The U.S. can't afford that; South Korea doesn't want that. We also don't want a sudden regime collapse in the North because there's no clear blue print for how to deal with that.

Where does Canada come in?

We have to remember that Canada is a Pacific nation and Canada still enjoys a very positive reputation here in Korea because of the Korean War experience.

Stability on the Korean Peninsula is definitely in Canadian interest, not just because of strategic and political reasons but also because of our growing commercial interests and people-to-people relationships. There are over 200,000 Koreans living in Canada today with over a million people travelling between the two countries every year. The Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement is our first FTA in the Asia-Pacific region.

There are prospects for closer cooperation between the two countries, ranging anywhere from maritime security to cyber security and joint training programs, as well as defence procurement, disaster relief and humanitarian engagements.

Vice-Admiral Jung Jin-Sup of the Republic of Korea Fleet, Tina Park, and Royal Canadian Navy Commander Vice-Admiral Ron Lloyd on board on HMCS Winnipeg in Busan, South Korea to celebrate Canada’s 150th anniversary (photo courtesy of Hanbyul Randy Lee)

Defection a serious blow to North Korean government, says UUֱ��'s Tina Park

lavende4 — Mon, 22 Aug 2016 12:55:59 +0000

Defection a serious blow to North Korean government, says UUֱ��'s Tina Park

lavende4 Mon, 08/22/2016 - 08:55

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People watch a television news broadcast showing file footage of Thae Yong-Ho, North Korea's deputy ambassador to Britain (JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images)

Topic

Global Lens

Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy

North Korea

Global

Last week, Thae Yong-ho, a high-ranking North Korean diplomat who was based in Britain, defected to South Korea, making him one of the most prominent officials to do so in recent years. UUֱ�� News spoke to Tina Park, a UUֱ�� PhD student researching Korean-Canadian relations and Executive Director of the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, about the defection.

What is so important about Thae's defection?

Thae presents a very unique case of one of the most senior North Korean officials to defect in nearly two decades. It is shocking for two reasons: it is very rare for North Korea's political elites to defect – because of the class-based social hierarchy (songbun) in North Korea, Thae and his family would most likely have had a comfortable lifestyle waiting in Pyongyang. The privileged class in North Korea are often sent abroad for education or work, but ultimately return back to North Korea.

Perhaps more importantly, Thae was one of the most skilled diplomats who was in charge of spreading pro-North propaganda in Europe and had spent much of his career advancing the cause of the Kim regime. Thae lived in London for a decade, long trusted because he and his wife came from elite families with close connection to Kim Il-Sung. So defection from someone like Thae who essentially spent his life promoting the regime is particularly shocking – especially because of how much he knows about the regime and the risk that he took in defecting. The inside knowledge that he would be able to share with the South Korean intelligence system will be extremely revealing.

What do we know so far about why he defected?

We have yet to hear directly from Thae but the South Korean government released a statement listing three reasons: first, disillusionment about the North Korean regime; second, ideals about life in South Korea; third, concerns for the education and livelihood of his two sons. I think the last reason is a very plausible one – Thae has two sons, one with a degree in public health and another one who is about to enter an undergraduate program. Because they lived abroad for over a decade, he may have feared the difficulties in re-integration for his children, since his younger son in particular would have to be indoctrinated with the Juche-based system at a wholly different level and a lifestyle very different from the one they enjoyed in London.

There are also speculations about the institutional difficulties that Thae may have had in recent years – there have been severe funding cuts to the overseas embassies since Kim Jong Un assumed power, and various North Korean diplomats have engaged in illegal activities to raise funds to send back to Pyongyang. Having spent a fair amount of time abroad, both during his studies and for his work as a diplomat, Thae would be fully aware of the actual state of the North Korean regime in terms of international sanctions, concerns about human rights violations and nuclear proliferation, the degree of economic hardship and starvation at home, and international attitudes towards the regime. He would also be aware of the growing sense of fear among the political elites in North Korea since the execution of Jang Song Thaek (Kim Jong Un's powerful uncle) in 2013.

There has been a steady growth in the number of public executions in the last few years in North Korea of dissenters and anyone who posed a threat to the Kim regime. Thae would have followed all of that closely, while still having to defend the regime in his public capacity. It would have posed a tremendous psychological pressure in addition to the financial difficulties he faced with the funding cuts.

How many North Korean defectors are there in South Korea -- and what kind of challenges do they face?

There are many other cases of defection – this year alone, more than 700 people have defected from North Korea, including 13 workers from a North Korean restaurant in Ningbo, China. Some 27,000 North Korean defectors currently reside in South Korea, many of whom sought to escape from hunger, oppression and the reign of fear and paranoia in the North Korean regime. After screening, they are sent to the Hanawon, a place designated to assist the defectors with integration in the South Korean society. They are also given financial support and psychological support in the process. In high-profile cases, South Korea's national intelligence service team and other police agencies would provide protection services and many of them would assume a different identity and get a job. Depending on their level of knowledge, some of them might even be employed by the South Korean government. Re-integration to South Korea is not an easy process for many North Koreans, especially as they adjust to a culture of freedom and learning about capitalism – many of them struggle with having so many choices and the spirit of competition which is prevalent in South Korea.

How is North Korea reacting to Thae's defection?

Initially North Korea was very quiet but this past weekend, North Korea has finally made an official statement through the KCNA (Korean Central News Agency) about the case, accusing Thae as a corrupted official who raped minors and stole public funds. Since his defection, North Korea has severely tightened its control of overseas offices (closing down some of its 54 offices), as well as dispatching an investigative team from Pyongyang for a full-fledged screening of cellphones and other communication channels of its staff and their families, and full censorship of their interactions and ideological training. Some of them have been called back to Pyongyang, and the UK office where Thae used to work has largely remained closed so far. Defection from the core class is generally rare, because the North Korean society is built around serving the privileged class, and even high-ranking diplomatic officials abroad are closely monitored by their colleagues. Apparently it was Thae's role to monitor the North Korean Ambassador in the UK, so you can imagine the shock felt in Pyongyang.

What does this mean for the future of inter-Korean relations?

Symbolically, Thae's defection is very significant as an indication of the fragility in the North Korean elite circle. The strength of North Korean society comes from unfailing belief in their leadership and ideological solidarity, especially in the ruling class, and it has a potential to encourage others to do the same, though I suspect that the North Korean regime will tighten security and surveillance measures to prevent such moves in the coming days. The South Korean government and media, as we have seen so far, will take every opportunity to publicize this case. To what extent this particular defection will affect the strategic and political relationship on the Korean peninsula remains to be seen, and we must not over-emphasize the importance of a singular event.

What we know for sure is the broader picture about the state of North Korea – the UN Commission of Inquiry under Justice Michael Kirby has produced an unequivocal report about the state of gross human rights abuses and crimes against humanity taking place under daylight; the UN agencies continue to report a severe shortage of food and state of hunger and malnutrition in the general North Korean population; Pyongyang continues to invest its energy on nuclear weapons, missiles and its military capabilities, while facing a lack of support and cooperation from traditional allies like China; there is a growing use of technology and access to outside media (including South Korean soap operas and k-pops) in the general population; and most importantly, we are seeing clear signs of a growing instability within its elite class, which has served as the backbone of North Korean system for decades.

Thae's defection is a serious blow to the Kim Jong Un regime, especially on the issues of perception and internal solidarity. All of these factors point to a doomsday clock scenario for the North Korean regime.